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ARTICLE 
 
Space, time and the constitution of subjectivity: comparing Elias and Foucault1 
Paddy Dolan, Dublin Institute of Technology 
 
Abstract: The work of Foucault and Elias has been compared before in the social sciences 
and humanities, but here I argue that the main distinction between their approaches to the 
construction of subjectivity is the relative importance of space and time in their accounts.  
This is not just a matter of the “history of ideas,” as providing for the temporal dimension 
more fully in theories of subjectivity and the habitus allows for a greater understanding of 
how ways of being, acting and feeling in different spaces are related but largely 
unintended.  Here I argue that discursive practices, governmental operations and 
technologies of the self (explanatory claims of both Foucault and the Foucauldian tradition) 
take shape as processes within the continuities of the figurational flow connecting people 
across space and time. Continuity should not be understood as stability or sameness over 
time, but as the contingent relations between successive social formations.  As Elias argues, 
there is a structure or order to long-term social change, albeit unplanned, and this 
ultimately provides the broader social explanation for the historicity of the subject.  Though 
discursive practices happen in particular spaces, we must recognise these spaces, and the 
practices therein, as socially constructed over time in response to largely unplanned moral 
and cultural developments. 
 
Keywords: Foucault, Elias, subjectivity, space, time. 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how both Foucault and Elias use the concepts of 
space and time in their explanations of subjectivity or habitus forma-tion, with a view to 
offering a critical comparison as well as stressing the primacy of the temporal dimension for 
the development of subjectivity.  Elias’s concern for tem-porality compared with Foucault’s 
emphasis on spatiality is noted by Ogborn in his comparison of their interpretation of Las 
Meninas by Diego Velázquez in terms of subjectivity.2  Here I attempt to elaborate more 
broadly on the implications of this space-time distinction for the construction of subjectivity 
or habitus. I also argue, pace Ogborn,3 that based on this distinction it is possible to choose 
between Foucault and Elias on the question of how the subject is formed.  Historians such 
                                                 
1 The focus here is primarily on Foucault’s account of subjectivity in Discipline and Punish and, to a lesser 
extent, The History of Sexuality. This allows closer comparison to Elias’s historical socio-logy of subjectivity 
or habitus. 
2 M. Ogborn, “Knowing the Individual: Michel Foucault and Norbert Elias on Las Meninas and the 
Modern Subject,” in Steve Pile and Nigel Thrift (ed.), Mapping the Subject: Geographies of Cultural 
Transformation (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 70. 
3 Ibid., 74. 
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as Hughes-Warrington also note that the spatial metaphors and symbols in Foucault’s 
writing are not simply “rhetorical flourishes.”4  However, the temporal dimension cannot 
be posited as independently primary, simply because all social processes and practices take 
place in specific spaces or sites.  For Foucault, the practices in those spaces are instrumental 
in the fabrication of particular subjectivities, so his vision of how the subject emerges is 
highly spatialized.  For Elias, the actual social spaces are less sig-nificant than the emotional 
experience of contradiction between a prior habitus (or embodied social learning, a second 
nature) and the emerging social pressures to conduct oneself differently.  This contradiction 
occurs over time, over the life course of each individual, but the social pressure to act in 
new ways, with a different and more nuanced outlook, takes shape in new prescriptions 
and cultural guidelines that often require several generations to develop.  Furthermore, this 
individual expe-rience of discontinuity (between how one formerly conducted oneself and 
one’s new expectations) emerges within the processual flow of changing social 
interdependen-cies that exhibit a continuity with older social formations.  
 
Though Foucault’s analysis went beyond the spatial, his insistence on rupture, 
discontinuity, and surveillance has encouraged a spatialized conception of subject-tivity at 
the expense of a temporal one.  I argue that different forms of subjectivity are deeply 
interconnected, and consequently that Foucauldian analysis has taken the principle of 
spatial and temporal dispersion too far.  Ultimately, time is given pri-macy over space 
because spaces occur through time; in other words, people con-struct the various sites of 
surveillance, instruction and reflection according to deve-loping social functions (the social 
need to teach, punish, or contain people, and indeed the space to encourage or incite them 
to work, confess, relax, and also expe-rience excitement).  These functions, though, are 
partly planned and partly inchoate attempts to manage responses to unplanned changes in 
the structure of social relationships (over space and time) brought on by competition and 
co-operation.  
 
The reason to compare Elias and Foucault is simply that both sought to explain the 
constitution of subjectivity.  It could be argued of course that both did so in different ways 
and therefore defy direct comparison.  But by relating their respective explana-tions, the 
value and limitations of each come into sharper relief, and social scientists (and indeed for 
those advocating a more public sociology, people beyond any academic specialisation) 
continue to try to explain how we come to see ourselves as we do, and how we place limits 
and capacities on ourselves and others.  Elias and Foucault asked similar questions in 
relation to the subject.  Elias’s work is a sustai-ned deconstruction and critique of homo 
clausus that he claims permeates the social sciences, as well as an attempt to conceive of 
subjectivity (though Elias prefers the older concept of habitus) in terms of homines aperti.5 
                                                 
4 Marnie Hughes-Warrington, “The ‘Ins’ and ‘Outs’ of History: Revision as Non- Place.” History and 
Theory, 46, 4 (2007): 71. 
5 Norbert Elias, What Is Sociology? (London: Hutchinson, 1978). 
Foucault Studies, No 8 
 3
Foucault’s objects of inquiry, varied and substantively similar to Elias’s, also concern “the 
different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.”6  The fact that 
Foucault stresses discontinuities and challenges the notion of long-term historical develop-
ments (which in Elias’s sense are more fruitfully seen as social processes over many 
generations) should in no way insulate him from critical analysis and comparison.7 To 
Foucault’s credit of course, he welcomed critical responses to his work.8  Though elaborated 
in the discussion below it is important at this point to state clearly that the Foucault-Elias 
comparison should not be viewed merely as a matter of exegetical interest.  The time-space 
differentiation concerning subjectivity produces different explanations that can be assessed.  
Admittedly this differentiation has to be seen in terms of the balance of emphasis between 
spatial and temporal dimensions (and, obviously, recognising that movement through 
space takes time).  But the prioritiza-tion of spatial metaphors tends to narrow the 
timeframe of habitus or subject formation; each individual is incited through the 
deployment of expert discourses and practices to become a type of person, to recognise 
themselves as desiring or producing individuals according to the discursive practices 
implemented in specific, often closed or delineated, spaces.  There are theoretically as many 
subjectivities or ways of being as there are discursive practices organised within particular 
institu-tional sites. 
 
For Elias, the formation of habitus takes considerable time and occurs across multi-ple 
spaces.  But the spaces themselves are less significant than the constellation (or figuration to 
use Elias’s term) of many interdependent people through which each person’s habitus, 
from early infancy, takes shape.  As the social network to which the person belongs 
becomes more differentiated over time, new pressures in the form of standards of conduct 
or social expectations develop which often collide with former codes of conduct and actual 
behaviour.  Gradual change enables the develop-ment of more stable, but unplanned 
(because the network changes are largely un-planned) forms of habitus, though 
contradictory feelings, constraints and compul-sions are normal.  More rapid change can 
produce resistance and a fossilisation of habitus as the sense of one’s identity feels 
threatened by “external” groups or by increasing pressures towards social integration in the 
form of nation-states or supranational groups.9  This emotional sense of conflicting 
identities can be expe-rienced in schools, factories, offices, churches and sports stadia to 
name but a few, though the experience will be different depending on each person’s 
position and trajectory within the dynamic, multi-tiered social network or figuration (this 
                                                 
6 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (ed.), Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 208. 
7 See Richard Kilminster, The Sociological Revolution: From the Enlightenment to the Global Age 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 85. 
8 Michel Foucault, “The History of Sexuality” in Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1972-1977. Edited by Colin Gordon (Harlow, Essex: The Harvester Press, 1980), 193. 
9 Norbert Elias, The Society of Individuals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 212-214. 
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conve-niently provides an example of the inescapable use of both spatial and temporal 
metaphors, but the question of emphasis is crucial for the development of different 
understandings of the subject).  These contradictions and conflicts depend more on 
temporal than spatial disruptions, but such disruptions are not discontinuous as there is a 
structure or order to the unplanned figurational changes – there is continuity.  In the next 
section, I briefly address previous comparisons of Elias and Foucault before highlighting in 
greater detail the similarities and contrasts between them in terms of relative time-space 
orientations towards the development of habi-tus or subjectivity. 
 
Figurational and Foucauldian evaluations 
Of course others writing from a figurational perspective have already compared Foucault 
and Elias,10 and here there is a range between those suggesting compati-bility such as Smith 
and, to a lesser extent, Van Krieken, and those emphasising contrast such as Burkitt, 
Kilminster and Newton. Newton’s comparison and asso-ciated critique is more aimed at 
Foucauldians than Foucault himself.  However, he rightly notes “that continuity and 
discontinuity do not present mutually exclusive choices for historical analysis, and that we 
do not have to choose between a Foucauldian sense of ‘rupture’ and a traditional historical 
interest in continuity across time.”11  For Spierenburg, their main similarity centres on the 
analysis of his-torical change and the resulting contrast with present society.  However, he 
notes that Foucault neglects long-term gradual development in favour of highlighting 
abrupt change.  Spierenburg though is less concerned with subjectivity than with 
understanding broad civilizing processes through an examination of penal practices over 
time.  Like Burkitt and Van Krieken, he finds similarities in Foucault’s and Elias’s depiction 
of power as an omnipresent feature of society, though Spierenburg argues that Foucault 
tends to personify power.12  
 
Burkitt notes that while Elias connects changing images of the self to “dynamic networks of 
                                                 
10 Ian Burkitt, Social Selves: Theories of the Social Formation of Personality (London: Sage, 1991); Ian Burkitt, 
“Overcoming Metaphysics: Elias and Foucault on Power and Freedom,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 
23, 1 (1993); Ian Burkitt, “The Shifting Concept of the Self,” History of the Human Sciences, 7, 2 (1994); 
Kiliminister; T. Newton, “Resocialising the Subject? A Re-Reading of Grey's ’Career as a Project of the 
Self....’” Sociology, 30, 1 (1996); T. Newton “Power, Subjectivity and British Indus-trial and Organizational 
Sociology: The Relevance of the Work of Norbert Elias,” Sociology, 33, 2 (1999); T. Newton, “From 
Freemasons to the Employee: Organization, History and Subjectivity,” Organization Studies, 25, 8 (2004); 
D. Smith, “The Civilizing Process and the History of Sexuality: Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel 
Foucault,” Theory and Society, 28, 1 (1999); Pieter Spienenburg,  “Punishment, Power, and History: 
Foucault and Elias,” Social Science History, 28, 4 (2004); Robert Van Krieken, “Proto-Governmentalization 
and the Historical Formation of Organizational Subjectivity,” Economy and Society, 25, 2 (1996); and Robert 
Van Krieken, Norbert Elias (London: Routledge, 1998). 
11 Newton, “From Freemasons to the Employee: Organization, History and Subjectivity,” 1365. 
12 See also Burkitt, “Overcoming Metaphysics: Elias and Foucault on Power and Freedom” on this point. 
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social relations,” Foucault sees such changes as “linked to dis-courses.”13  The texts of the 
Enlightenment did not produce feelings and practices of individuality, but reflected 
broader social changes.14  However, in a later paper Bur-kitt agrees with Averill’s criticism 
of Elias to the effect that he neglects the produc-tive capacity of regulations to orient 
emotional conduct.15  Burkitt favourably cites Foucault’s History of Sexuality as an example 
of how prescriptive texts in Antiquity were used to produce feelings of friendship and love.  
The question remains, how-ever, to what extent do such texts reflect changes in social 
interdependencies and related shifts in power ratios or, alternatively, produce emotions ab 
initio?  Certainly such texts find receptive audiences who engage their imaginations 
through the scenes of novels (a development examined by Elias16 in terms of romantic love 
in court societies, to which Burkitt refers), but it is difficult to conceive of expert discourses 
inciting romantic love or sexual longing as opposed to providing guidelines for conduct.17  
 
In an early comparison of the two theorists, Van Krieken recognises their conver-gence on 
the substantive topic of the historicity of subjectivity, but contrasts Fou-cault’s rejection of 
the repressive hypothesis in relation to sexuality with Elias’s focus on the growing superego 
in the transition to adulthood.18  For Elias, the con-cept of time is central to both social 
development (in a non-teleological sense) and self-development (in a non-normative sense).  
Though not in the context of a compa-rison with Foucault, Van Krieken highlights the 
significance of temporality in Elias’s conception of habitus formation through childhood.19  
This is the sense in which social standards are internalised by children over time, and, for 
example, the dura-tion of schooling increases to account for rising expectations of self-
control and foresight beyond the specific content of instruction.  
 
Smith offers a more direct comparison between The Civilizing Process and The History of 
Sexuality, and sees greater convergence than the other authors discussed above.20 Smith 
maintains that both “argue that the degree of centralization and the complexi-ty of 
networks of interdependence increased greatly over time.”21 To support this, Smith asserts 
that, like Elias, Foucault ties forms of sexual austerity to “a cluster of concrete 
relationships.”22 If we examine this quote in greater detail though, we see that Foucault 
understands such “concrete relationships” to mean 
                                                 
13 Burkitt, “The Shifting Concept of the Self,” 16. 
14 Ibid., 17-18. 
15 Ian Burkitt, “Social Relationships and Emotions,” Sociology, 31,1 (1997): 49-50. 
16 Norbert Elias, The Court Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). 
17 Cas Wouters, Sex and Manners: Female Emancipation in the West, 1890-2000 (London: Sage, 2004). 
18 Van Krieken, “The Organization of the Soul: Elias and Foucault on Discipline and the Self.”  
19 Van Krieken, Norbert Elias, 153-154. 
20 D. Smith, “The Civilizing Process and the History of Sexuality: Comparing Norbert Elias and Michel 
Foucault,” Theory and Society, 28, 1 (1999). 
21 Ibid., 85. 
22 Foucault cited in Smith, 84. 
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relations to the body, with the question of health, …the relation to the other sex,   with 
the question of the spouse as privileged partner, …the relation to one’s own sex, …and 
finally, the relation to truth, where the question is raised of the spiritual conditions that 
enable one to gain access to wisdom.23  
 
Without diminishing the significance of these relations, these are not equivalent to the 
mobile social tissue of mutual and varied dependencies with many other people of diverse 
social functions characterised by Elias’s concept of figuration.  Admitted-ly, there are 
affinities in various passages of The Care of the Self24 that Smith identifies, but these do not 
amount to figurational explanations because the long-term, imam-nent dynamics of the 
structural aspects of society, or the structure of social change, are not addressed.  Foucault 
does make the connection between the changing ways in which the ethical subject must 
relate to new conditions of reciprocity and greater equality between men and women, but 
the emphasis is on the former rather than the latter.  The experience of pleasure is seen as 
changing in the course of its problema-tization by the ethical subject, but the kinds of social 
pressures leading to conceptual and affective innovations, which inform Elias’s approach, 
are marginalised:  
 
A growth of public constraints and prohibitions?  An individualistic withdrawal 
accompanying the valorization of private life?  We need instead to think in terms of a 
crisis of the subject, or rather a crisis of subjectivation – that is, in terms of a difficulty in 
the manner in which the individual could form himself as the ethical subject of his 
actions, and efforts to find in devotion to self that which could enable him to submit to 
rules and give a purpose to his existence.25  
 
The abovementioned comparisons are clearly important, but rather than see the 
convergences and differences mainly in terms of power, the subject or techniques of the self, 
I argue that we can more fully reveal the nature of subjectivity by exploring its temporal 
dimension, particularly the emotional experience of discontinuities through figurational 
continuities.  While Foucault eschewed the notion of historical continuity for fear of 
resurrecting human consciousness as the original subject, I contend that by following Elias’s 
understanding of continuity we avoid this eventuality precisely because of the unplanned, 
though structured, nature of figurational developments.  Before elaborating on this point, I 
want to briefly ad-dress Foucauldian evaluations of the Foucault-Elias comparison.  Rose26 
                                                 
23 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, the History of Sexuality: Vol. 2. (London: Penguin, 1992), 23. 
24 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self, the History of Sexuality: Vol. 3. (London: Penguin, 1990), 92-95. 
 
25 Ibid., 95. 
26 Nikolas Rose, “Authority and the Genealogy of Subjectivity,” in Paul Heelas, Scott Lash and Paul 
Morris (ed.), Detraditionalization: Critical Reflections on Authority and Identity (Oxford: Black-well 
Publishers, 1996); and Nikolas Rose, “Identity, Genealogy, History,” in Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay (ed.), 
Questions of Cultural Identity (London: Sage, 1996). 
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has been very clear in marking the contrast between Elias and Foucault in favour of the 
latter theorist.  
 
Rose’s interpretation of Foucault is highly instructive for the key distinction which pertains 
between Elias and Foucault in terms of time and space: 
 
Perhaps, rather than narrativizing the ways of being human, we need to spatialize being. 
Such a spatialization would render being intelligible in terms of the localization of 
repertoires of habits, routines and images of self-understanding and self-cultivation 
within specific domains of thought, action and value – libraries and studies, bedrooms 
and bathhouses, markets and department stores, living rooms and coffee houses.27  
 
Subjectivity is seen here as constructed through specific techniques connected to spe-cific 
discourses and knowledges and implemented in specific places.  Each has its own history 
and so attempts to connect across spaces are considered by Rose to conflate separate 
domains of activity.  For Elias,28 people who act as politicians, for example, are at other 
times businesspeople and sportspeople; in order to understand the functions of specific 
fields, we must see the relations between fields, and examine the total fluid network of 
people (in terms of their relationships and interdependences). Similarly, Elias and 
Dunning29 explain how organised and standardised sports emerged in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century in England as exciting activities in the context of increasing routinisation 
of many aspects of social life.  Specific sites and spaces were constructed and adapted by 
people over time to facilitate the “controlled decontrolling” of emotional constraints.  So the 
desire for leisure spaces is linked to diminishing or pacifying social conflict in other aspects 
of life.  This is a relative movement of course, as conflict remains in all social relations and 
these leisure spaces, such as sports stadia, are constantly in process them-selves as general 
social standards of acceptable aggression change.  The social needs for and experiences of 
these spaces are explained in terms of the figurational flow of greater state pacification, 
industrialization and urbanization over preceding centuries. 
 
The notion that space and time can be separated is obviously absurd.  Social prac-tices 
occur over time in specific places.  People spend Saturday afternoons shopping in malls or 
watching sports games.  They work in buildings and various other spaces throughout the 
day.  Space and time are inseparable in terms of human activity.  But Foucault placed far 
greater emphasis on real spaces and spatial metaphors in the construction of subjectivity.  
For Elias, subjectivity, or to use his preferred term, habi-tus, develops gradually through 
                                                 
27 Rose, ”Authority and the Genealogy of Subjectivity,” 304. 
28 Norbert Elias, “Introduction,” in Eric Dunning and Norbert Elias (ed.), Quest for Excitement: Sport and 
Leisure in the Civilizing Process. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 35. 
29 Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986). 
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the experiences of individuals in relations with many other people over the course of their 
lives. However, the ideas and values con-cerning how one should conduct oneself, also a 
prominent theme for Foucault, are analyzed and synthesized by Elias as particular 
processes within a broader set of social processes concerning functional specialization 
(especially the growing divi-sion of labour), social differentiation and lengthening chains of 
interdependence. Not only does Elias compare different time periods, he also connects the 
changes between them; in other words, he identifies the temporal structure of social change 
and the continuities underlying differences across time.  
 
While Foucault certainly differentiates between time periods, without structural explanations 
for the transformation of one social formation to the other, the com-parison across time is 
remarkably similar to comparing across space.  In the following sections I will attempt to 
highlight the significant differences between Elias and Foucault concerning habitus or 
subjectivity before claiming that Foucault’s relative marginalisation of temporal continuity is 
based on his misplaced assumption that such continuity must be based on the original subject 
of human consciousness. 
Social control and self-identity 
The notion of being controlled by other people in the course of which one begins to exert 
control over oneself is a theme common to both Elias and Foucault.  As with the following 
other themes, I will first discuss each theorist’s treatment in turn before highlighting key 
contrasts and convergences.  The concepts of time and space will be addressed through 
these themes instead of a separate analysis.  Perhaps Foucault’s fullest exposition on social 
control came in Discipline and Punish.30 Here, Foucault opens with the public spectacle of a 
man condemned to torture and execu-tion as a display of the king’s sovereign power. 
Foucault traces changes in disciple-nary and punitive practices over the following century 
that includes the diminished use of physical force on the individual body (and the practice 
of inflicting severe pain), and the emergence of disciplinary mechanisms and techniques 
that act on bodies in more confined and sequestered spaces – prisons.  Clearly these 
techniques have a temporal dimension in that they are implemented over short time 
periods (in the case of long prison sentences, it is still the recurring frequency of 
surveillance techniques that are at issue rather than a gradual unfolding of a long-term 
process), but the theoretical significance for the construction of subjectivity is visual exami-
nation within confined spaces.  Foucault places particular emphasis on the time peri-od 
between 1760 and 1840, during which “The body as the major target of penal repression 
disappeared.”31  The spectacle of suffering no longer functioned as a war-ning to those 
contemplating legal transgressions; instead, the certainty of punitive consequences took its 
place.  Rather than the executioner acting on the body of the criminal, a completely new set 
of functional specialists (prison warders, doctors, psychiatrists) came to address the soul 
and psyche of the individual prisoner. These new functionaries also brought a growing 
                                                 
30 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
31 Ibid., 8. 
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sense of shame to punishing. 
 
This account has parallels with that of Elias in his analysis of the gradual advance in 
thresholds of repugnance and shame since the late middle ages, though there is no zero 
point or starting date to these civilizing processes.32  As the social standards regarding 
bodily comportment and control became more onerous and exacting, practices and conduct 
previously considered acceptable or unremarkable had increasingly to be hidden “behind 
the scenes” of social life, if not altogether banished.  There is even some convergence in the 
methodological use of etiquette, training and conduct manuals to examine people’s 
expectations of each other.  But these manuals are interpreted differently, according to the 
relative status of time and space in their accounts.  Foucault treats the manuals as sets of 
instructions that produce bodily practices for each recipient of such instruction.  Ultimately, 
this con-stellation of recurrent bodily movements and routines in constrained and 
observable spaces produce a mode of self-reflection and self-relation.  In other words, a quite 
direct generation of subjectivities emerges.  
 
In Elias’s case, what disappears over time from sets of instructions and pedagogical treatises 
is at least as significant as new rules and techniques.  He interprets the disappearance of 
rules as the effective internalization of social standards.  Elias examines the instructions and 
advice on particular topics of etiquette (for example, spitting, eating, and other bodily 
functions) in successive editions of manuals over centuries to discover when such advice 
has been removed, and also when rules have become more precise and elaborate.  The fact 
that so many rules recur with little change during the late medieval period indicates that 
the upper classes of this time had not accepted such principles of socially prescribed 
conduct to the extent that they could adhere to them without direct observation by others.  
The level of self-restraint and self-steering mechanisms were uneven and unstable.  
However, this does not mean that Elias followed a simple repressive hypothesis entailing 
the social control of natural instincts.  Many less civilized practices were generated and su-
stainned by specific, recurring social conflicts and relations that encouraged more 
impulsive conduct.  So the spaces of social conflict in relation to battles over terri-torial 
control produce a way of acting, thinking and feeling among the warrior nobility that 
shapes the social relations and practices in other spaces, including spaces that we would 
consider more “privatized” now, such as dining rooms and bedrooms.  The changing 
meaning and function of spaces, the very differentiation of space, occurs gradually over 
generations (time) as the imagined division between public and private (“I” and “we”) 
advances.  
 
Foucault’s account of the relation between social constraint and subjectivity is quite direct 
                                                 
32Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. Revised Edition (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2000). 
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and technical.  Clearly, Foucault was concerned with the implementation of objecttifying 
and subjectifying procedures in time and space, but here the space is highly controlled in 
relatively closed institutions such as prisons, schools and fac-tories.  The temporal 
dimension is significant insofar as prescribed activities are afforded particular durations for 
ideal performance and fulfillment.  People are in-dividualized and subjectified partly by 
virtue of occupying individual spaces, which permits closer social observation and control.  
The organization and differentiation of space allowed for more precise timing of school 
periods and apprenticeships; here “time” refers to strategic use of time as resource to 
achieve certain aims. Similarly, though Foucault also discusses historical events and 
political transformations, he tends to treat history as a discourse available as a tactic in 
power relations.33 
 
Elias, on the other hand, sees time mainly as an indicator of changes in social 
interdependencies.  Because of his emphasis on social processes, the notion of time is 
indispensable to his analysis and synthesis, but he pays far less attention than Foucault to 
the deliberate organization of time to meet objectives.  Elias of course did explain the 
invention and development of timing devices, from calendars to clocks, as human attempts 
at coordinating the interlocking of social functions (and therefore people) brought about by 
largely unplanned processes such as urbanization and commercialization.34  Foucault’s 
analysis of the timetable is perhaps an example of these timing devices, but he is less 
concerned with the long-term social generation of the need for such devices than with the 
effects of such devices once diffused through schools, factories and hospitals.  The timetable 
allowed “another degree of precision in the breakdown of gestures and movements, 
another way of adjusting the body to temporal imperatives.”35  The timetable encouraged 
individuals to be more produc-tive in their use of time.  The principle of panopticism would 
enable surveillance at all times, as people would be always aware that they may be under 
observation, but never certain that they actually are being observed.  Through this spatial 
organi-zation, they assume the role of self-surveillance to, ironically, avoid the potential 
punishments following observation of transgressions and hence apprehension.36  
 
In a way one could imagine Elias’s37 depiction of court society as a type of panoptical space, 
except, of course, that the members of the court were aware they were being observed by 
others.  But Elias explains this spatial development as an outcome of long-term social 
                                                 
33 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–1976 (New York: 
Picador, 2003), 189-212. 
34 Norbert Elias, Time: An Essay (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993). 
35 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 151. 
36 Ibid., 202-203. 
37 Elias, The Court Society; Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations.  
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changes over time, and it is the experience of disjunction over time as existing practices 
become unacceptable in new social contexts that unintentio-nally produces forms of 
subjectivity or habitus.  Territories became largely pacified through the survival contests 
between competing nobles trying to maintain their social meaning and identity.  With the 
effective monopoly of the means of violence by the winning noble house (which eventually 
became transformed into the state), provincial warrior nobles had little choice but to 
become courtiers in the service of the king at court.  Such nobles had to constrain their 
former impulsive conduct un-der strict etiquette rules that served the king’s status 
maintenance.  The theoretically significant point here is that the development of a type of 
controlled habitus (in-creasingly imagined as detached from others) is based on the 
temporal experience of living through a process of increasing social interdependencies and 
expectations, which necessarily involves emotional contradictions between how one used to 
be-have and how one is now expected to conduct oneself.  
 
It is crucial to note that Elias is not proposing that the lengthening chains of 
interdependence between more and more people over time did not create ab initio the self-
controlled person.  There is “no point at which human beings are uncivilized and as it were 
begin to be civilized.”38  People’s capacity for self-control through the development of their 
consciences become more even and stable with increasing, dif-ferrentiating and intensifying 
social interdependencies and complexities.  People at an earlier stage of social development 
(this should not be confused with some linear, teleological account, which Elias rejected) 
were capable of severe self-restraint on occasions for specific purposes, but this oscillated 
with conduct relatively free of social control, or indeed more impulsive conduct through 
open conflict and enmity. These forms of conduct were generally recognised as part of the 
particular social context or set of social relationships.  The division between self and others 
was less pronounced and so people were less inclined to “hold back” their socially shaped 
emotions.  Through increasing social complexity, people come to depend on more people 
for the fulfillment of more needs and desires, but these needs (themselves often socially 
generated) must be postponed, modified or abandoned in order to meet the needs of others.  
A more recurring and inescapable tension develops be-tween what one wants and what one 
needs to do in various social contexts.  It is this more consistent tension that produces the 
feeling of an inner emotional core or identity, which further produces feelings of 
detachment from both people and objects.  The crux of the civilizing process is that people 
became more self-steering and self-restrained through lengthening and differentiating 
interdependent links between more and more people.  This is obviously a long-term 
process that takes time, but social interdependencies can also shorten and simplify over 
time. 
 
It is not my contention here that Foucault never addresses the question of time, but that he 
prioritizes space rather than connections over several generations.  Of course his discussion 
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of the explosion of discourse around sexuality, combined with silence concerning certain 
social relationships such as parents and children or teachers and students, implies change 
over time and therefore echoes Elias.  Foucault’s interpret-tation of a former licentiousness 
in relation to sexuality and the body is also similar: 
 
 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century a certain frankness was still common, it 
would seem.  Sexual practices had little need of secrecy; words were said without undue 
reticence, and things were done without too much concealment; one had a tolerant 
familiarity with the illicit.  Codes regulating the coarse, the obscene, and the indecent 
were quite lax compared to those of the nineteenth century.39  
 
But Foucault’s explanations for this change over time are not given in terms of time; in 
other words, Foucault does not really account for the links between successive social 
formations that might connect to the rising fears and anxieties surrounding sexuality.  I 
qualify this interpretation slightly because Foucault does of course dis-cuss the problem of 
population as an emergent political problem from the begin-ning of the eighteenth century.  
The problem concerned “manpower’ and ‘wealth”40 and the need for productive labour; 
hence, new techniques of statistics such as birth rates and marriage rates developed.  
Foucault’s mode of analysis is more centred on the relations between the discourses of 
population and the discourses of sexual conduct, than with the relation between social 
developments and emerging prescriptions and proscriptions.  Once again, he reads a very 
direct connection into what political administrators and reformers wrote and what then 
transpired through normalizing practices.  This logic inevitably leads to the presumption of 
intentions, plans and strategies, even if such objectives are deemed subjectless.  In the next 
sec-tion, I examine the crucial issue of continuity over time, perhaps the clearest dis-tinction 
between Elias and Foucault, though largely attributable to their different interpretations of 
this term.41  
 
Social interdependencies, history and temporal continuity 
It has become almost commonplace to characterize Foucault’s work as merely discursive or 
lacking in relation to reality.  Burkitt, for example, argues that Foucault “sees the social 
construction of the individual as occurring entirely within discourse,”42 and that “there is 
the idea in Foucault that discourse creates the real within its own domain and there is no 
real, practical world outside it.”43 Similarly, Pickering warns, primarily in relation to 
Foucault, that 
 
                                                 
39 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction: Vol. 1. (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 3. 
40 Ibid., 25.  
41 See also Ogborn, 69, on this point. 
42 Burkitt, Social Selves: Theories of the Social Formation of Personality, 96. 
43 Ibid., 100. 
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unless we wish to jettison any sense that it is their experience [“of ordinary men and 
women”] which is primarily in the frame, then we have to work with some 
epistemological claim to referentiality.  It is on these grounds that history needs to be 
rescued from the enormous condescension of poststructuralism.44 
 
One could cite many examples of critiques such as these.  But a close reading of Fou-cault’s 
later work, from Discipline and Punish onwards, suggests that this commen-tary is unfair.  
Foucault does sometimes locate discursive practices in terms of broader social changes and 
actual events.  Indeed he argues that “there is nothing to be gained from describing this 
autonomous layer of discourses unless one can relate it to other layers, practices, 
institutions, social relations, political relations, and so on.”45  But, to use a spatial metaphor, 
the distance between the discourse and the institutions and social relations identified by 
Foucault tend to be short; he cites an example concerning the above quote in terms of the 
relation between the “episte-mological domain of medicine” and hospitalization.46  
 
With regard to referentiality, however, it is clear that Foucault does not doubt the opening 
torture and execution scene of Discipline and Punish.  He does not question the reality of 
prison architecture that really aimed at monitoring prisoners.  So once again there are some 
similarities with Elias, but here the difference is in the centrality and explanatory status of 
broad social changes for Elias compared to the almost incidental and background treatment 
of social processes by Foucault.  By social processes I am referring to well-worn sociological 
concepts such as urbani-zation, industrialization, migration, commercialization and 
democratization.  Fou-cauldians, of course, can easily cite page numbers where these or 
similar words are mentioned, but we need to compare this to what was originally the 
second volume (part two in the revised edition) of The Civilizing Process.  It is here that Elias 
and Foucault really part ways, and it is here that their treatment of time diverges consi-
derably.  
 
Elias traces the changing structure of society over centuries.  Consequently, the ad-vancing 
threshold of shame, the increasing emphasis on self-control and the gro-wing feeling of 
separation from others are all connected to this unplanned development.  People of course 
make plans within this unplanned, fluid social net-work, but their aims, intentions and 
strategies are already shaped by the prevailing beliefs, attitudes and culture together with 
their understanding of the relevant social contexts.  The construction of subjectivity and 
identity is much more indirect for Elias as he links the emotional experiences of people, 
their social relations and interdependencies (not just the specific relation between teacher 
                                                 
44 Michael Pickering, History, Experience and Cultural Studies (Hampshire and London: Macmillan Press, 
1997), 244 (original emphasis). 
45 Michel Foucault, “On the Ways of Writing History,” in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984. Vol. 2. Edited by J.D. Faubion (London: Pen-guin 
Books, 2000), 284.  
46 Ibid., 285. 
Dolan: Space, Time and the Constitution of Subjectivity 
 14
and pupil, warden and prisoner, psychotherapist and patient) and the shifting power 
relations between conflicting and competing classes and other groups.  As classes become 
more inter-dependent with the commercialization and monetization of society, as well as 
pro-cesses of industrialization and urbanization which also mean increasing social 
interdependencies, the power ratio becomes less unequal.  Within figurations of widening 
social distance between classes and a fairly rigid hierarchy, the very uneven power balance 
means different codes of conduct depending on the specific relation.  It was taboo for lower 
class people to act impulsively in front of their social superiors.  However, the rules of 
conduct were quite different in relations from the perspective of the higher classes.  They 
could engage in conduct in front of their servants or other lower ranked people with much 
less concern about causing offence.  Though courtiers had become accustomed to varying 
their conduct and emotional displays according to the specific social encounter and their 
current judgement of the shifting hierarchy at court, the growing equalization between 
classes meant that individuals had to constrain or mould their conduct almost irrespective 
of the class position of the people they encountered.  The emotions and feelings that had 
been associated with social relationships lost their social compass, yet were still experienced 
as a legacy of a habitus formed under different social conditions, and also because emotions 
have a biological dimension.  Since people were under increasing pressure to restrain and 
adjust their emotional conduct no matter the class composition of other people in their 
company, they began to imagine the locus of emotional experience as emanating from 
within themselves.  
 
This new emotional experience reinforced the already developing individualization 
processes set in train by social and self-observation and by virtue of processes of functional 
specialisation and social differentiation.  These social and psychic con-ditions started to 
prevail throughout society as interdependencies grew between classes and groups, though 
not with the same intensity across the class spectrum. Through a growing sense of self-
detachment, increasing options resulting from functional democratization, and increasing 
anxieties surrounding status, proper conduct, self-fulfillment and careerism, it is not 
surprising that some people developed new insights or knowledge about how to cope and 
prosper in changed circumstances.  Eventually such knowledge became crystallized in 
techniques, skills and even occupations, thereby adding to the social complexity and 
interdepen-dencies in society.  But in this Eliasian analysis the felt need for psychological 
coun-seling or therapy develops before and then in tandem with the growth of new 
specialists, some of whom no doubt exploit insecurities and anxieties.  It is quite another 
matter though to position these new social functions as creating through their discursive 
practices the way individuals come to recognise and work on them-selves as ethical 
subjects.  Again it is important to note that these practices can in-deed have effects, but the 
need for such interventions is generated by broader, unplanned social processes, in which 
the feelings of individuality, uniqueness and insularity are also not the result of expert 
discourses and discursive practices.  The significance of temporality here is not the 
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imposition of temporal controls through timetables and performance measures, but the 
contradictions experienced by people as figurations, the network of interdependent people, 
develop over time, become more interdependent and complex or alternatively less 
interconnected.  
 
So the prioritization of space or time is not simply a matter of research interest on the part 
of theorists, providing different but equally tenable explanations for emerging 
subjectivities.  Time is crucial, both for the individual across his or her life course, and for 
the largely unplanned figuration of which he or she is a part.  Though different spaces may 
be deliberately constructed to allow for different social (and self) experiences (churches, 
sports stadia, cinemas, theatres, houses), their functions are interdependent because there is 
a structured, narrative coherency to the habitus rather than a fragmented dispersion across 
space.  This does not mean that subjectivity is devoid of contradictions; people experience 
contradictions through changes in sets of social interdependencies over time.  Former 
enemies be-come allies, friendships dissolve, nations or communities lose some of their 
func-tions to higher levels of social organization, and families become havens of emotional 
succour as their former functions of labour recede.  These are unplanned processes that 
shape the experience of identity and subjectivity in particular con-texts, but these contexts 
can be temporally linked as well as spatialized. The direc-tion, structure and pace of social 
change produce contradictions, anxieties and uncertainties in status, expectations and 
conduct.  
 
Foucault is much more circumspect about the uses of history in his work.  He has of course 
been a huge influence on the discipline of history, but he tends to sharply divide 
historians.47 Munslow supports Foucault’s historiographical innovations, particularly the 
principle that “Foucauldian history does not evolve diachronically, but is best understood 
synchronically, as an explosive discursive structure.”48 Though Burke argues that Foucault 
fails to “discuss the mechanics of change,”49 he recognises the value in Foucault’s approach 
for undermining the notion of historical progress.  Foucault is particularly sceptical about 
the notion of continuity between successive phases in history.  Indeed, he questions the 
very idea of conventional chronology in traditional historical discourse.50 He seems to 
consign classical approaches to history to the past, perhaps leading him to prioritize space: 
“As we know, the great obsession of the nineteenth century was history: …The present age 
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49 Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), 151. 
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may be the age of space instead.”51  Foucault does recognise that space has a history and 
that space and time are intertwined.52  But the question of historical continuity is either 
evaded or more typically attacked.  Though he notes that discourses do not float free from 
history, he emphasises the need to consider their “isomorphisms.”53  He advocates “serial 
history,” which does not accept a priori truisms of feudalism and industrial development, 
but rather the archive of available documents themselves.54  Once these conventional objects 
of historiography are critically ad-dressed (and dismissed if the documents dictate such), 
“History appears then not as a great continuity underneath an apparent discontinuity, but 
as a tangle of super-imposed discontinuities.”55  So here history is spatialized as different 
levels and types of processes and practices potentially co-existing.  Elias would not doubt 
that multiple processes and practices, such as inflation and agricultural practices, occur 
simultaneously.  But this does not negate the continuity of successive, and differ-rently 
structured, social formations.  Foucault seems sometimes to conflate continui-ty with 
sameness, linearity or teleology, but Elias rejected these assumptions of figurational change 
and social development.  Elias also tended to avoid concepts like capitalism and modernity 
precisely because of their tendency to impose a monolithic structure on societies in specific 
time periods.  
 
Foucault questions historians’ focus on long time periods precisely because of the 
presumed connotation of stability beneath the apparent discontinuities: “Beneath the 
rapidly changing history of governments, wars, and famines, there emerge other, 
apparently unmoving histories.”56  But there is no need to posit unchanging bed-rocks of 
change in order to demonstrate structural links between successive phases in long time 
periods.  Elias connects this tendency to the imagined tenet in philoso-phy that identifying 
regularity and law-like stability in scientific discovery repre-sents the highest value.57 
However, Foucault’s suspicion of anything resembling totality or unity in society leads him 
to doubt meanings beyond documents them-selves and to seek totalities and unities, such 
as they are, within the corpus of identified documents themselves.58  This is significantly 
different from Elias’s treat-ments, and, once again, this is of no mere exegetical interest.  As 
discussed above, once prescriptions and proscriptions disappear from etiquette manuals, 
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Elias infers that such advice has become redundant and the standards have become 
“internalised” or, more properly, social constraints towards self-constraints (though self 
compulsions should also be considered) have advanced.  This development is obviously 
time-dependent and Elias seeks these temporal changes precisely because of his incipient 
theorisation of the temporality of habitus.  The apparent basis of Fou-cault’s rejection of 
“total history” is that he sees in it an attempt to make “human consciousness the original 
subject of all historical development and all action.”59 Because he must reject supreme 
human agency, he must reject historical continuity, but there is a certain irony in assuming 
that finding order in social change is tantamount to advocating some invisible hand or 
intentional subject.  Elias conceives of no such subject of total history, due to the largely 
uncontrollable, but patterned, developing chain of interdependent links between people 
over time and across space. 
  
Conclusion 
Elias and Foucault share many common themes and concerns: the body, the development 
of self-control, power relations (rather than power as an individual possession), their sense 
of detachment, refusal to seek origins, and indeed emerging incitements in “discourses,” to 
use Foucault’s term.  But one of the main distinctions between them is the significance and 
prioritisation of space and time in their various explanations, and this has implications for 
how subjectivity or habitus is theorised. In Discipline and Punish Foucault stresses the 
importance of spatial differentiation for the surveillance, correction and normalizing of 
individuals.  Though of course this surveillance and normalization takes time, and is a set 
of processes as well as prac-tices, the temporal aspect is short and recurring compared to 
the long-term struc-tural change that Elias reconstructs from historiographic texts that are 
treated as re-presentations (evidence) of past social realities.  Foucault also used such texts 
but eschewed any notion of “continuity underneath an apparent discontinuity”; rather, he 
sees history “as a tangle of superimposed discontinuities.”60 Foucault states that the 
genealogical approach “must record the singularity of events… it must be sensitive to their 
recurrence, not to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different 
scenes where they engaged in different roles.”61   Here, there is clearly a prioritization of 
space over time.  
 
I argue that the space-time comparison between Foucault and Elias is of more significance 
than a “history of ideas.”  We require temporalised concepts to explain changing 
subjectivities.  And subjectivities do change, a point acknowledged by Fou-cault and 
Foucauldians alike.  But the latter tend to recognise space and difference (as if mapping 
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forms of subjectivity) as the principle of comparison.  It is a limited explanation that locates 
the source of subjectivities in techniques and discursive practices that have as their design 
and ambition the construction of such subject-tivities.  No doubt some spaces are designed 
for surveillance, but the first space that human beings encounter through which their 
subjectivities and identities develop is the family home (notwithstanding the brief stay in 
hospital).  The parent or parents do not simply restate medical or psychological discourses 
and target their children as objects to be made subjects accordingly.  They invoke their own 
childhood expe-riences, current social standards of conduct and adapt them in relation to 
changing and anticipated social expectations and opportunities.  As children grow they be-
come interdependent with more and more people (some relatively voluntary, such as 
friendship networks, others more subject to social pressure such as teacher-pupil 
relationships) and so layers of capacities, dispositions and inclinations are inte-grated, often 
in conflict and contradiction.  Indeed it is this temporal contradiction once the person is 
seen in movement through a series of multiplying and differen-tiated social relationships, 
combined with historically recent cultural values of indi-vidual sovereignty produced by 
growing social complexity that produces feelings of separateness and in turn particular 
forms of subjectivity.  Of course these series of moves (which must be conceived as 
continuous movement rather than jumps be-tween periods of stability) could be described 
in spatial terms; one was there and is now here.  But a theoretical account of this 
spatialization would have to address how the spaces themselves constitute the subject, 
rather than the values, codes of con-duct, and emotional displays which take time to 
develop and in fact remain in pro-cess (not progress).  
 
Historical continuity is important in relation to subjectivity for another obvious rea-son; as 
antagonistic or highly distinct social groups gradually become more inter-dependent 
(incidentally groups could become less interdependent over time, or the nature of their 
interdependencies could shift, and this would affect their sense of self and identity), such as 
classes, nations, generations, or genders, the formerly distinct codes of conduct often 
intermingle, largely imperceptibly to the people involved, without the guidance of expert 
discourses.  The former distance between them and the pace of their power ratio 
realignment affects the extent to which codes form hybrids or whether the codes of the 
rising groups are exaggerated as signs of triumph.  In terms of national habitus Elias 
compares the relatively weak self-steering capacity of German people in the interwar 
period to the more stable conscience-formation of the English and French resulting from 
their different patterns of state development, in particular the relatively even and longer 
established state pacification and greater links between people within the national 
territory.62  This produces different ways of seeing, behaving and feeling (though of course 
every person varies due to their position within the figuration) that cannot be explained in 
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terms of techniques or spatial surveillance.  
 
It is Foucault’s conflation of belief in historical continuity and belief in the original subject 
of history that tends to spatialise rather than temporalise his account of subjectivity, but 
following Elias, there is no need for such conflation.  Elias does not posit any unchanging 
factor beneath the flow of changing conditions, nor does he see intention or design in the 
structured order of social change.63  
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